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Property Rights and Income Inequality 
 
Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact that property rights exert on income 
inequality. It has been widely argued that income inequality is one of the catalysts of 
poverty and economic disparities between the haves and the have-nots. Moreover, 
advocates in favor of economic planning and government intervention have contended 
that one of the methods to reduce income inequality is for the state to play a redistributive 
role such as imposing a wealth tax, a progressive income tax, or even imposing a 
minimum wage. Although these measures portray genuine intentions, the overwhelming 
empirical evidence shows that these well-intended policies generated adversarial results. 
This paper argues that income inequality is a normal, natural, and mandatory 
characteristic for the economic development of civil society. This paper intends to 
demonstrate that income inequality is not inherently a predicament for the economic 
evolution of the citizenry but a necessary condition to ensure their growth. To 
demonstrate the validity of arguments, we intended to use statistical methods as 
illustrative and communicative tools of analysis rather than predictive tools. 




I - INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The concept of property rights is definitely not new. It has existed for centuries. However, 
the concept of property rights has been vigorously opposed by socialist intellectuals such 
as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, or Oskar Lange. In his book What 
is Property? published in 1840, Proudhon made the famous claim that “property is theft.” 
By “property,” Proudhon referred to a concept regarding land property that originated 
in Roman Law, the right of the proprietor to do with his property as he pleases, “to use 
and abuse,” so long as in the end, he submits to the state-sanctioned title.1 In the third 
chapter of What is Property? Proudhon argued that the right to property was the original 
evil on the earth and that it is the first link in the long chain of crimes and misfortunes 
which the human race has endured.2 For Proudhon, the right to property generates class 
distinction, slavery, and an oppressive system whereby the proprietor has the absolute 
right and legitimacy to abuse his power over the have-nots. For these reasons, Proudhon 
proposed a stateless society where the right to property will no longer exist. If the right 
to property no longer exists, then there is no need to have a state to enforce that right. 
Hence Proudhon argued that in a stateless society, no one will privately own anything. 
Resources would be communally owned and shared. It was on this theoretical framework 
that Marx and Engels built their own conception of private property.  
 
Unlike Proudhon, Marx and Engels did not see the abolition of the state as a means 
to abolish the right to property. On the contrary, Marx and Engels contended that the 
state was necessary to ensure that the resources are communally owned. Under a socialist 
state, the right to private property will no longer exist since everything will be state-
owned. Only the state will have the legal right to own property and whatever the 
individual produces, the fruit of his output does not belong to him but to the state 
apparatus. That way, according to Marx and Engels, it is impossible to create income 
inequality. This is what we have seen with Soviet Russia when Lenin became its leader. 
 
 Proudhon, Marx, and Engels did see the issue of private property from a political 
philosophy approach whereas Oskar Lange’s approach to private property were purely 
from an economic lens. Oskar Lange is best known for his work in welfare economics, 
more precisely for the development of “market socialism” in his essay On the Economic 
Theory of Socialism, published in 1938. In the essay, he mainly argued that socialism could 
achieve efficiency where private ownership failed—that is, where private ownership led 
to monopoly.3 For Lange, private property is the engine of monopoly. And under such a 
system, resources cannot be allocated efficiently and cannot stimulate economic growth. 
Nonetheless, Lange was not opposed to the abolition of property rights because he 
believed that so long as competition remains plentiful and effective, vested interest could 
 
1 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. Qu’est-ce que la Propriété? Ou Recherche sur le principe du Droit et du gouvernement. 
(1840). 1st edition. Paris: Brocard. p. 2. 
2 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. “Chapter III: Prescription Gives No Title to Property.” What is Property? An 
Inquiry Into the Principle of Right and of Government. (1876) Translated and Published by Benj. R. Tucker, 
Princeton, Massachusetts.   
3 Persky, Joseph. “Retrospectives: Lange and von Mises, Large-Scale Enterprises, and the Economic Case 
for Socialism.” Journal of Economic Perspectives. (1991). Vol. 5, Number 4. pp. 229-236.  
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not prevent this progressive march.4 In fact, Lange suggested that it was neither necessary 
nor wise to abolish “private ownership and private property of the means of production 
in those fields where real competition still prevails, i.e., in small-scale industry and 
farming.5 In these fields, Lange asserted that private property of the means of production 
and private enterprise may well continue to have a useful social function by being more 
efficient than a socialized industry might be.6 But outside of these fields, Lange believed 
that this almost Austrian picture of the economy represented a “thing of the past.”7 Lange 
furthered his contention on private property by asserting that in large-scale industries, 
individuals have been replaced by large corporations enjoying considerable economies 
of scale and wielding monopolistic power.8 For Lange, only socialism could avoid the 
worst characteristics of monopoly: the attempts to restrict production and seek political 
power.9 The conundrum with Lange’s approach to private property is that the 
socialization of the means of production may prevent the formation of monopolies from 
private ownership but it will also create a monopoly from the government over these 
same resources. If the private sector is forbidden from owning the means of production, 
then the public sector, the sector that does not create any substantial wealth, is the one 
that owns the means of production. The dangerous aspect of this trend is that when the 
means of production are owned by the public sector, it leads to economic stagnation, 
national decline, and more income inequality. 
 
 Income inequality has been perceived as a real predicament to the social and 
economic development of individuals in civil society. Proponents of political intervention 
in the economy such as Oskar Lange or Thomas Piketty have asseverated that one of the 
reasons why income inequality remains such a prevalent issue in our society is because 
the wealth is not redistributed adequately enough; that those who own the means of 
production become richer and richer while those who “actually” produce the goods and 
services that we consume on a daily basis, become poorer and poorer. To then rectify the 
supposedly social upheaval, Thomas Piketty in his book Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century (2014) proposed a radical progressive income tax as the solution to reduce the 
gap between the haves and the have-nots. As a matter of fact, Piketty reasoned that 
taxation is not a technical but primarily a political and philosophical matter. Like Lange, 
Piketty believed that a radical progressive income where the owners of the means of 
production will be taxed at more than 70 percent.10 He even goes as far as proposing a 
global wealth tax on capital. Both ideas are proposed on the ground that the rich deserve 
to be excessively taxed since they have excessive incomes (incomes they do not need since 
they are extremely wealthy). Like Lange, Piketty failed to realize that the deprivation of 
private property from the rich will lead to massive unemployment because the owners 
of the means of production are the ones who possess the capital to create new wealth. By 
imposing a progressive income tax on the rich with a marginal rate above the reasonable 
level, Piketty generates the incentives for a transfer of capital from the private sector to 
the public sector. However, the public sector does not possess the right incentives to 
 
4 Ibid. p. 230 
5 Ibid. p. 230 
6 Ibid. p. 230 
7 Ibid. p. 231 
8 Ibid. p. 231 
9 Ibid. p. 231 
10 Piketty, Thomas. “Rethinking the Progressive Income Tax” Capital in the Twenty-First Century. (2014). pp. 
630-663. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN: 978-0-674-97985-7 
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allocate resources efficiently since it is not motivated by profit but by the expansion of 
political power. Since the public sector is mainly motivated by expanding its power, it 
naturally allocates resources in such a way that more taxes are extracted from the income 
of the layman, which makes it even harder for the latter to create a business or something 
of value that could generate new wealth. 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to explain the relationship between property rights 
and income inequality and to analyze the impact that private property exerts on income 
inequality. Furthermore, we also seek to expound that income inequality is a natural 
social phenomenon in any civil society wherein a higher access to property rights leads 
to a higher degree of economic growth and development, especially in countries that are 
not as developed. In this paper, we have intended to use statistical methods for 
illustrative purposes rather than predictive purposes. Our analysis does not consist in 
engaging in forecasting and prescriptive analysis, but mainly using econometric 
techniques to simply demonstrate the empirical content of our analysis.  
 
II – THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
   
a) An Understanding of the Enclosures Laws 
The right to property is, by far, the most important condition to ensure economic growth 
at every level of an economy. Before the Industrial Revolution, the concept of property 
rights was not truly perceived as a factor of economic development. In 1604, the British 
Parliament passed into law the first enclosure acts which effectuated the transfer of land 
ownership from being communally-owned to becoming privately-owned. As a matter of 
fact, the enclosure laws marked the foundation of the development of private property 
and the development of capitalism.  
Private ownership of land, and in particular absolute private ownership, is a 
modern idea, only a few hundred years old.11 The idea that one man could possess all 
rights to one stretch of land to the exclusion of everybody else” was outside the 
comprehension of most tribespeople, or indeed of medieval peasants.12 Before the 
effectuation of enclosure laws, only the king, or the Lord of the Manor, might have owned 
an estate in one sense of the world, but the peasant enjoyed all sorts of so-called 
“usufructory” rights which enabled him, or her, to graze stock, cut wood or peat, draw 
water or grow crops, on various plots of land at specified times of the year.13 The open-
field system of farming, which dominated the flatter more arable central counties of 
England throughout the later medieval and into the modern period, is a classic common 
property system which can be seen in many parts of the world.14 The open-field system 
was fairly equitable as they scaled economies since production output significantly 
grew.15 
The enclosure laws, for over a century, have expanded the use of land as private 
property, which implies that a system of exchange and profit has been progressively 
developed. The final and most contentious wave of land enclosures in England occurred 
 
11 “A Short History of Enclosure in Britain.” The Land Magazine. (2009). p. 19 
12 Ibid. p. 19 
13 Ibid. p. 19 
14 Ibid. p. 19 
15 Ibid. p. 20 
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between 1750 and 1850. Whereas the purpose of most enclosures had been to turn 
productive arable land into a less productive sheep pasture, the colonization of Scotland 
for wool, and India and the Southern United States for cotton now prompted the 
advocates of the enclosure laws to play a different set of cards: their aims were to turn 
open fields, pastures and wastelands into more productive arable and mixed farmland.16 
Their express aim was to increase efficiency and production and so both create and feed 
an increasingly large proletariat who would work either as wage laborers in the 
improved fields or as machine minders in the factories. 
b) The Impact of the Industrial Revolution on Property Rights 
The Industrial Revolution is undeniably the most consequential economic transformation 
that human civilization has ever encountered in modern history. Under the Industrial 
Revolution, property rights did take another dimension as it has become the main driver 
of economic progress. John Locke was one of the first philosophers and intellectuals to 
develop a theory of property rights. Yet, his theories on property rights were principally 
argued from a philosophical standpoint. Adam Smith is the first philosopher, however, 
to have given a rigorous economic analysis on property rights. In Book V, Chapter III of 
The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith stated that “commerce and manufactures can 
seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, 
in which people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property, in 
which the faith of contracts is not supported by law…”17 Smith does indeed recognize 
that property rights are a necessary condition to ensure economic growth. 
 The focal point of Smith on private property is that the right to legal ownership 
enables the augmentation of productivity and efficiency. Smith argues that private 
property incites personal responsibility. The property-holder of a resource is naturally 
inclined to be more responsible and to make responsible and reasonable decisions 
regarding the management and the utilization of that resource. A property-holder knows 
how much needs to be invested in the resource he owns in order to expand its production. 
Adam Smith recognized that private property encapsulates three factors of production 
namely labor, capital, and land.18 He emphasized labor as an important factor of 
production along with other factors and observed, “the annual about of nation is the fund 
which originally supplies it with all necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually 
consumes and which consists always either in immediate produce from other nations.”19 
Labor is the foundational element that authenticates the concept of private property. 
Adam Smith believed that the real cost of production shall tend to diminish with the 
passage of time, as a result, the existence of internal and external economies occurring 
out of the increases in market size.20  
 The appropriation and accumulation of capital began to become significant during 
and after the Industrial Revolution era. Before the Industrial Revolution, for relatively 
seventy millennia, the standard of living of the vast majority of humans was at, or very 
 
16 Ibid. p. 24 
17 Smith, Adam. “Book V: Chapter III: Of Public Debts.” The Wealth of Nations. (1776). Published by Modern 
Library in 1994. p. 985. ISBN: 978-0679424734 
18 “Adam Smith Theory of Development in Economics.” Economics Discussion.  
19 Economics Discussions. Ibid.  
20 Economics Discussions. Ibid.  
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near, subsistence.21 The Industrial Revolution was a turning point in the evolution of 
human history because it has importantly promulgated the improvement of the living 
standard of individuals. And the two factors that have greatly contributed to the 
improvement of the living standard of people during and after the Industrial Revolution 
were private property and the free market. 
  The Industrial Revolution commenced in Great Britain. It was a period in history 
where large changes began to take place for the living standard of everyone, whether it 
was from poorer working-class families to middle-class families with a bit of extra 
spending money, to extremely wealthy nobles; advances in technology, along with new 
ideas of how to manufacture good, would change the face of the classes and their living 
standards forever.22 Between 1760 and 1860 in England, the Industrial Revolution 
resulted in many outcomes.23 One of these outcomes was a steady rise in income.24  The 
main, but not the only reason, why income has raised during the Industrial Revolution; 
is because the economic system under this revolution happened allowed individuals to 
increase productivity and therefore to accumulate capital. And the accumulation of 
capital has subsequently enabled the creation of more employment. With very few 
regulations in place, individuals with some financial capital were able to generate new 
businesses. And the creation of new businesses evidently demanded more people to be 
employed. Although they were no adequate labor laws, and that sometimes workers 
could work over fifteen-hours a day; it has nonetheless helped these workers gaining a 
better wage than what they may use to receive before or even during the Industrial 
Revolution. It is clear that British income per person rose from about $400 in 1760 to $430 
in 1800, to $500 in 1830 and then jumped to $800 in 186025 as we can see in figure 1. 
 
 
21 Boudreaux, Donald, J. “Talk About a Revolution” Foundation for Economic Education (FEE), (2011).  
22 “The Standard of Living in Europe During the Industrial Revolution” Foundation of Western Culture. 
(2016).  
23 Foundation of Western Culture. Ibid.  
24 Foundation of Western Culture. Ibid.  

































































Income per capita in Great Britain during the 
Industrial Revolution from 1760 to 1860 
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Figure 1. Source: N. F. R. Crafts, “British Economic Growth, 1700-1831: a Review of the Evidence. The 
Economic History Review. Second Series, Volume XXXVI, No 2. (1983). And “Six centuries of British 
Economic Growth: a time-series perspective” European Review of Economic History. Volume 21, pp. 141-
158. (2017). 
 
Although income growth was initially slow in the early years of the Revolution, the 
income surged twice faster after 1830.26 For this doubling of real income per person 
between 1760 and 1860 not to have made the lowest-income people better off, the share 
of income going to the lowest 65 percent of the population would have had to fall by half 
for them to be worse off after all that growth.27 It does not mean that there was no 
inequality at all. Evidently, income inequality existed then. Moreover, most economic 
historians agree that the distribution of income became more unequal between 1790 and 
1840.28 In 1760, the lowest 65 percent received about 29 percent of total income in Britain; 
in 1860, their share was down only four percentage points to 25 percent.29 So the lowest 
65 percent were substantially better off, with an increase in average real income of more 
than 70 percent.30 The market economy that was established during the Industrial 
Revolution has been definitive because the income and living standard of everyone has 
increased ever since. People accumulated more capital and therefore could increase more 
production and economic growth. 
III – THE IMPACT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS ON INCOME 
It is undeniable that there is a clear relationship between property rights and income. As 
a matter of fact, it has been argued that property rights are the key factor in economic 
development. The higher is the degree of access to property rights, the higher is the 
income and wealth created from that access to property rights. This assertation logically 
stands and needs to be ascertained. Consequently, in this part of the analysis, we decided 
to test the relationship between property rights and income in order to empirically 
ascertain its significance. 
a) Data  
The data collected for our analysis are a combination of the values of the International 
Property Rights Index and that of the World Bank for the years 2019 and 2020. The values 
of income variable, which is our dependent variable, have been extracted from the World 
Bank data for the year 2019-2020 and the values of property rights, which is our 
explanatory variable, have been extracted from the International Property Rights Index 
for the year 2019. In the correlative dataset that we created; we measured the impact that 
property rights index exerts on the income per capita of societies. The countries selected 
to build our data are the most advanced countries on the planet. They are either part of 
the G-7 or part of the G-20 or are leading economically in their geographical region. 
According to the International Property Rights Index, a country is in good standing if it 
has a property rights index above 4.5 point-index. Countries with a property rights index 
above 6.5 are considered to be in very good standing, meaning that property laws are 
 
26 Clark, Ibid.  
27 Clark, Ibid.  
28 Clark, Ibid.  
29 Clark, Ibid.  
30 Clark, Ibid.  
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firmly established and therefore, their standard of living is reflective of the income made 
per person in those countries is significantly higher than in most countries.  







United States 8.202 67,426 
United Kingdom 8.044 40,391.84 
Germany 7.85 47,992.32 
Switzerland 8.571 86,673.15 
Hong Kong 7.902 36,060 
Singapore 8.462 64,829 
Brazil 5.564 10,400 
Canada 8.264 47,931.46 
Japan 8.323 47,200 
Mauritius 6.297 11,720.62 
Denmark 8.174 61,350.35 
Sweden 8.28 51,829.08 
Estonia 7.173 24,802.77 
Netherlands 8.273 52,900 
South Korea 6.621 31,246.04 
Australia 8.363 52,952.77 
New Zealand 8.514 42,084.44 
Argentina 5.087 9,730.00 
Chile 6.88 14,650 
Luxembourg 8.275 116,727.21 
Taiwan 7.306 25,525.81 
Ireland 7.612 80,264 
South Africa 6.071 6,193.17 
France 7.384 42,943.95 
Table 1. Source: World Bank, International Property Rights Index, Author’s computation 
b) The Model 
Since our data is bivariate, which means that we will be only testing two variables (one 
dependent variable and one explanatory variable), it logically follows that the statistical 
model to use is a simple linear regression. However, while testing the model, we 
acknowledge that a simple linear regression did not fit because the relationship between 
the dependent and explanatory variables is curvilinear. Therefore, the appropriate 
statistical model to use for our analysis is the quadratic polynomial regression model. 
The equation is subsequently written as the following: 
 10 
𝑌 = 𝛽! + 𝛽"𝑥 + 𝛽#𝑋# +⋯+ 𝛽#$𝑋#$ + 𝜀  
where (i = 1, 2, …, 24). This equation could be simplified as: 
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The output of our regression analysis after computation gives us the following equation: 
𝑌 = −5.662 × 10&"'𝑋#$ +⋯+ 6565.14𝑋# − 69248.20𝑋 + 190615.33 + 18818.14 
R2 = 0.7441 
 





As we have stated at the commencement of this analysis, we indicated that the goal of 
using statistical techniques in our analysis was not to make predictions but to simply 
illustrate empirically the impact of the correlation between property rights and income. 
As we can observe in the regression model, we can clearly see that there is a strong 




























Correlation between Property Rights and 
Income
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property rights are inextricably linked.31 The importance of having well-defined and 
strongly protected property rights is now widely recognized among economists and 
policymakers.32 A private property system gives individuals the exclusive right to use 
their resources as they see fit, and that dominion over what is theirs leads property users 
to take full account of all the benefits and costs of employing those resources in a 
particular manner.33 The process of weighing costs and benefits produces efficient 
outcomes.34 The excuses for development failures are legion: lack of natural resources; 
insufficient funding of education, culture, religion, and history; and recently 
geographical location.35 As Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto points out, capitalism 
has been successful mainly in the West36, and one of the reasons why capitalism has been 
such a success is because property rights have been not only protected, but they have 
been used efficiently to created economic growth. Depending on the measure, real 
income varies across countries.37 In 2000, real per-capita GDP was $50,061 in Luxembourg 
and $138 in Sierra Leone. As we can see in figure 3, income per capita in Luxembourg 
doubled over the last twenty years and it more than tripled in Sierra Leone although the 
disparity in income between the two countries is significantly large. 
 
Figure 3. Source: World Bank. Note: the Logarithm scale was used to fit both measures in the graph since 
the gap between the two countries significantly large. Income per capita in Luxembourg is about $100,000 
on average while it is $400 in Sierra Leone. 
 
It is evident that the disparity between the two countries is due to its difference in 
property rights. As we observed the data from the International Property Rights Index 
 
31 O’Driscoll Jr., Gerald P., Hoskins, Lee. “Property Rights: The Key to Economic Development” Policy 
Analysis. (2003). Working Paper No. 482. p. 1. Cato Institute.   
32 Ibid. p. 1  
33 Ibid. p. 1 
34 Ibid. p. 1 
35 Ibid. p. 2 
36 Ibid. p. 2 































































Income per capita comparison between 
Luxembourg and Sierra Leone from 2000 to 2020
Luxmbourg Sierra Leone
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for both countries, we can see that Luxembourg has a property rights index averaging 8-
point-index from 2009 to 2019 while Sierra Leone has a property rights index averaging 
point-index of 4 for that same period. 
 
Figure 4. Source: International Property Rights Index 
 
Luxembourg has a property index that is twice that of Sierra Leone simply because the 
rule of law allows for the protection of private property. In a country like Luxembourg, 
the legal system is functioning properly, although not perfectly, which allows individuals 
to have the freedom to undertake, to create new businesses that produce new goods and 
services. The creation of these new goods and services enable the augmentation of 
employment and the creation of new wealth. The creation of new wealth is possible in 
countries like Luxembourg because the power of the government is limited. In countries 
like Sierra Leone, however, where poverty and political instability remain prevalent, it is 
far more difficult to create new wealth and to improve the living standard of ordinary 
citizens because property rights are not protected by the rule of law. As a result, the 
power of the state is heavily centralized and expansionary, which means that the 
individuals living in such societies are not inherently free to pursue whatever pleases 
them. Access to property is highly regulated and corrupted because the legal system in 
these societies does not have strong institutions to preserve the liberties of the people. 
d) Is Income Inequality Bad? 
As was aforementioned in the introduction of this analysis, economists like Thomas 
Piketty have been advocating for a more redistributive role of government on the premise 
that income inequality stimulated more poverty. But the inquiry here is to know if income 
inequality necessarily implies that the majority of people are worst-off. In countries like 
the United States, the debate about income inequality has become the main topic in 
political debates, and politicians in favor of economic planning have seized the 
opportunity to promote confiscatory methods such as the wealth tax, which is strongly 
advocated by Elizabeth Warren, and the progressive income tax at a high rate on the 
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Fundamentally, the societies that we call “developed countries,” are developed 
because they have a certain degree of income inequality. Without income inequality, they 
would have not had the level of economic development they have today. The United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Scandinavian countries, Brazil, China, Japan; 
just to name a few, are examples of developed countries. Yet each of these countries 
mentioned has a considerable degree of income inequality. As justice is well-established, 
people do have access to property rights, and therefore they can create capital and 
increase their labor productivity. As a matter of fact, income inequality naturally and 
logically expands to a considerable degree in societies that value the rule of law and 
private property because when the power of the government is restrained from 
intervening in the economy, individuals maximize the output of their economic 
production since they have the freedom to decide on how they want to manage their own 
resources. We cannot expect individuals to have the same economic outcome if they 
manage their resources differently.  
The economic productivity of a society is to some extent based on how resources 
are managed. If an individual manages his resources in an efficient way that generate 
substantial profit, consequently his income will be higher than the one who did not 
manage his resources adequately. Income inequality can also grow in a society where 
there is no rule of law, where access to private property is significantly limited, and where 
resources are mismanaged. The lack of rule of law and an effective administration of 
justice impedes access to private property. Access to private property is a fundamental 
economic law that not only guarantees higher labor productivity, but above all 
guarantees an efficient allocation of resources, and therefore a much higher income. 
IV – CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the paper led us to comprehend that property rights and economic 
development do go hand-in-hand. It is logically impossible for a society to fully develop 
itself economically if it does not have a strong legal system that relies on the protection 
of private property. Our statistical model showed that there is indeed a strong correlation 
between property rights and income. Evidently, the higher is the access to property of a 
society, the higher is its income. The correlation that is established between income and 
property rights is naturally the factor of income inequality.  
There are two kinds of income inequality. There is a positive income inequality, 
which is created by the private sector. This kind of income inequality is a positive and 
healthy inequality because it is based on the two fundamental elements which create 
economic growth that are the rule of law and private property. Negative income 
inequality is created by the public sector. It relies on corruption and the concept of rent-
seeking. In countries like Sierra Leone or the Central African Republic where income 
inequality is created by the public sector through a lack of justice and an absence of 
private property, those who work for the government become much wealthier than the 






Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. Qu’est-ce que la Propriété? Ou Recherche sur le principe du Droit et 
du gouvernement. (1840). 1st edition. Paris: Brocard. p. 2. 
 
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. “Chapter III: Prescription Gives No Title to Property.” What is 
Property? An Inquiry Into the Principle of Right and of Government. (1876) Translated and 
Published by Benj. R. Tucker, Princeton, Massachusetts.   
 
Persky, Joseph. “Retrospectives: Lange and von Mises, Large-Scale Enterprises, and the 
Economic Case for Socialism.” Journal of Economic Perspectives. (1991). Vol. 5, Number 4. 
pp. 229-236.  
 
Ibid. p. 230 
 
Ibid. p. 230 
 
Ibid. p. 230 
 
Ibid. p. 231 
 
Ibid. p. 231 
 
Ibid. p. 231 
 
Piketty, Thomas. “Rethinking the Progressive Income Tax” Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century. (2014). pp. 630-663. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN: 978-
0-674-97985-7 
“A Short History of Enclosure in Britain.” The Land Magazine. (2009). p. 19 
 
Ibid. p. 19 
 
Ibid. p. 19 
 
Ibid. p. 19 
 
Ibid. p. 20 
 
Ibid. p. 24 
 
Smith, Adam. “Book V: Chapter III: Of Public Debts.” The Wealth of Nations. (1776). 
Published by Modern Library in 1994. p. 985. ISBN: 978-0679424734 
 
“Adam Smith Theory of Development in Economics.” Economics Discussion.  
 
Economics Discussions. Ibid.  
 
Economics Discussions. Ibid.  
 15 
Boudreaux, Donald, J. “Talk About a Revolution” Foundation for Economic Education 
(FEE), (2011).  
 
“The Standard of Living in Europe During the Industrial Revolution” Foundation of 
Western Culture. (2016).  
 
Foundation of Western Culture. Ibid.  
 
Foundation of Western Culture. Ibid.  
 
Nardinelli, Clark, “Industrial Revolution and the Standard of Living” The Library of 
Economics and Liberty. Article.  
 
Clark, Ibid.  
 
Clark, Ibid.  
 
Clark, Ibid.  
 
Clark, Ibid.  
 
Clark, Ibid.  
 
O’Driscoll Jr., Gerald P., Hoskins, Lee. “Property Rights: The Key to Economic 
Development” Policy Analysis. (2003). Working Paper No. 482. p. 1. Cato Institute.   
 
Ibid. p. 1  
 
Ibid. p. 1 
 
Ibid. p. 1 
 
Ibid. p. 2 
 
Ibid. p. 2 
 
Ibid. p. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
